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“We know that many people are apprehensive about our largeness and often associate us with
dangerous and clumsy bears. This association, by the way, is quite to the point here. Since a bear
is a caring father and attached to its family it has no enemies in the natural environment. Usually,
it doesn’t attack if not disturbed …Yes, we are bears! But what’s wrong with that?”
-- Alexei Miller, CEO of Gazprom, December 12, 2008

I. Introduction
The image of Russia as a menacing bear, ready to spring on friend and foe alike if it senses a
threat, is as salient a depiction today as it was in the 19th century. Over the past few years,
articles in The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal have stressed the resurgence of a
dominant grizzly Russia, intent on dislodging the United States from its position as the
international superpower. Arctic races have replaced space races, missile defense receptors in
Poland have supplanted Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, and scholars and newspapers alike
have announced a “new Cold War” with trepidation1. Accounts of power centralization under
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, combined with the creeping eradication of local authority, have
only further contributed to fears about an emergent Kremlin bid for global hegemony.
This ascension is not contained within the military realm. In fact, it is the energy sector that
has commanded more attention since Putin became president in 2000 and subsequently chose
Dmitri Medvedev, former Chairman of Gazprom, the national energy company, as his successor
in March 2008. Russia’s emergence as the world’s largest producer of natural gas, combined
with its geographical proximity and control of regional pipelines, have prompted fears regarding
likely energy dependence among European and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
countries. Critics allege that the vertically-integrated nature of Gazprom and the state’s 50.002
percent share indicate Russia’s desire to exert its influence over global affairs using energy as a
foreign policy instrument. The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute in January 2009, for example,
1

See, for example, “Is This a New Cold War?” RFE/RL, August 27, 2008; Cathy Young, “From Russia with
Loathing.” New York Times, November 21, 2008.
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attracted international attention when a regional pricing disagreement resulted in gas disruptions
for European citizens.
Since 2002, under the leadership of former president and current Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin, natural gas and oil prices have been steadily rising both domestically and abroad.
Gazprom’s 2007 decision to raise gas prices for Russian industrial consumers to market levels in
2011, while controversial, was foretold in the 2003 Energy Strategy for Russia. It called for a
“well grounded increase in domestic prices for energy carriers at such rates which are
economically-warrantable and acceptable for consumers,” a direct precursor to the steps the
Russian government has allowed Gazprom to take toward eliminating domestic subsidies.2 The
government has taken similar actions abroad by creating new long-term contracts with Baltic and
CIS states that increase energy prices annually. When one of the transit states refuses to or
cannot pay the specified amount, Gazprom shuts off the pipeline to those states or only pumps
enough gas to meet its contractual obligations to its European customers (Germany, Poland,
Slovakia, Czech Republic, etc).3 Gazprom currently has contracts in place (three worth $250
billion) that extend to 2020. As the domestic demand for gas rises due to increasing incomes, the
“conflict between demand priorities” will eventually become inevitable.4 As such, Gazprom
must not only invest in new projects and field exploration, it must raise prices in order to gain
revenues for those projects to take place.
It is against this backdrop that the debate over “revisionism” has been resurrected among
scholars studying international relations. Those who believe Russia wants to reshape the

2

Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, The Summary of the Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period of up
to 2020, Approved August 28, 2003.
3
Rawi Abdelal, “Gazprom (A): Energy and Strategy in Russian History,” Harvard Business School Case Study,
(Boston: Havard Business School Publishing, September 2008), 6.
4
Leslie Dienes, “Natural Gas in the Context of Russia’s Energy System,” Demokratizatsiia, 15 no. 4, (2007), 415.
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international order tend to view Russia as a “revisionist” state rather than a “status quo state.”5
The extent to which a state is status-quo or revisionist has traditionally been examined by placing
it within a geopolitical or military context, and much like the semantic arguments offensedefense theory has engendered, scholars have offered succeeding definitions of the relevant
terms. Perhaps the most basic distinction has been proposed by Hans Morgenthau, who contends
that “a nation whose foreign policy aims at acquiring more power than it actually has, through a
reversal of existing power relations, pursues a policy of imperialism,” while “a nation whose
foreign policy tends toward keeping power and not toward changing the distribution of power in
its favor pursues a policy of the status quo.”6 Jason Lyall writes that though the definition of
revisionism depends on the context and the shared rules of the game must be understood by both
parties, revisionist states “provid[e] the shock that disrupts the international equilibrium.”7 He
also argues that revisionist states are willing to violate norms by using force and seek to recast
the “existing material balance of power,” which is “defined by relative military capabilities.”8
Alastair Ian Johnston agrees that revisionist states may consider military might a critical tool,
because it will prove helpful if “the actor has internalized a clear preference for a radical
redistribution of material power in the international system and the actor’s behavior is aimed […]
at realizing such a redistribution.”9 Rebuilding an international order, then, comprises the
ultimate goal of revisionist states. They seek not only to maximize security in an anarchic world,
but also to increase their sphere of influence or power relative to other states.

5

Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in,” International Security, 19
no. 1 (Summer 1994), 99.
6
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1985),
53, 56.
7
Jason Lyall, “Paths of Ruin: Why Revisionist States Arise and Die in World Politics.” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell
University, May 2005), 35.
8
Ibid.,18.
9
Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International Security, 27 no. 4 (Spring 2003), 11.
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The approach of policymakers and policy wonks to Russian energy security is consistent with
the revisionist model .Senate hearings perpetuate confirmation bias by soliciting nearly-identical
testimonies, such as the June 12, 2008 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that
portrayed Russia as the sole aggressor in Eurasian energy security disputes. All four panelists
offered the same insight: the need for Europe to diversify away from Russia owing to the volatile
nature of its gas transport. None of them blamed the recipient or transit countries for the
disruptions.10 At the hearing, Senator Richard Lugar opened the proceedings with a statement
that read: “Gazprom’s monopoly-seeking activities cannot be explained by economic motives
alone […] the Kremlin and Gazprom have shut off energy supplies to six different countries
during the last several years.”11 Lugar’s non-sequitur, that is, Gazprom’s shutting off energy
supplies must be unrelated to its economic motives, indicates the extent to which politics has
been infused into this discussion. Keith C. Smith of CSIS jumps to the same conclusion when he
writes that “Moscow’s success in using its energy resources as political leverage” will
“undermine the new democracies that most recently emerged from decade of Kremlin control.”12
The policy linkage to which he alludes is both logically unsound and bereft of evidence. Another
example conflating politics and economics reads: “its energy market power has allowed Russia
to consolidate political power internally… Putin … has orchestrated a change in rules for
parties to get into the lower house of parliament.”13 The logic here seems to predicate on the
linking of energy market power and political power. Carlos Pascual of the Brookings Institution
assumes that Gazprom’s profit and market capitalization have enabled Putin to control the
10

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, “Oil, Oligarchs and Opportunity: Energy from Central Asia to
Europe,” June 12, 2008.
11
Richard G. Lugar, “Opening Statement,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, “Oil, Oligarchs and
Opportunity: Energy from Central Asia to Europe,” June 12, 2008.
12
Keith C. Smith, “Russian Energy Politics and its Challenge to Western Policy Makers,” CSIS, March 2008, 3.
13
Carlos Pascual, “The Geopolitics of Energy: From Security to Survival,” The Brookings Institution, January 2008,
8.
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appointments of governors and the upper house (known as the Federation Council) of the Duma.
It might be true that ensuring high approval ratings is contingent upon keeping the Russian
coffers full of oil money. Claiming that those coffers allowed Putin to change the percentage
threshold a party must obtain to gain entrance into the Duma, however, is tenuous.14 Ultimately,
Lugar’s and Pascual’s specious arguments obscure the real issue at hand and allow the Western
perception of Russian energy negotiations to be tainted by irrelevant observations about domestic
political manipulations.
Unsurprisingly, the Baltic media has attacked Russia for the periodic gas cuts, suggesting that
Russia’s inability to fix the broken Druzhba pipeline that connected Russia to Lithuania in
August 2006 was reflective of the Kremlin’s antagonism toward Lithuania.15 While this attitude
is to be expected from post-Communist states eager to be rid of Russia’s influence, the Western
media has also been quick to demonize Gazprom, claiming that negotiations are politically
motivated and ultimately painting Belarus, Ukraine, or other recipient countries as the victim. An
article chronicling the Russo-Ukrainian gas skirmish of January 2009 described the dispute as
one “ostensibly over prices and transit fees, but that is also deeply entwined in post-Soviet
politics.”16 Another article in February described Russia’s resort to a familiar position as
“empire-builder and scourge of the West.”17 These revisionist images seem not to be based on a
systematic analysis of Russian energy policies yet they seem to influence public discourse.
While the status-quo/revisionist dichotomy is useful in generating questions pertaining to the
rise of a state on the international stage, neither term adequately explains Russia’s intentions
with regards to its energy machinations. Russian foreign policy is perplexing because it hasn’t
14

In 2007, Putin raised the percentage threshold of votes a party needed to gain entrance to the Duma from 5 percent
to 7 percent. See Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia’s Choice, (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 120.
15
“Pipeline to Mazeikiu may remain dry for up to one year,” Baltic Times, August 10, 2006.
16
Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia and Ukraine Agree on Gas Prices,” New York Times, January 19, 2009.
17
Matthew Kaminski, “Why Nurture Russia’s Illusions?” Wall Street Journal, February 16, 2009.
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fulfilled some scholars’ predictions of a neo-imperialist state, but its character has undoubtedly
become more assertive under Putin.18 Moreover, Russia can fall into both realist and neo-liberal
camps; it issues threats to Georgia, warning it not to interfere with its pipelines, but
simultaneously accedes to regional economic cooperatives, such as the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation Organization. Assigning Russia a status-quo or revisionist label, then, might prove
an arbitrary exercise. In addition, some power transition theorists argue that revisionist states act
as realist states do, by attempting to maximize security while benefiting from the rules of the
game. In their view, all states operate with the same cost-benefit analysis, so revisionist states act
rationally and are simply looking after their national interests.19 Then again, this view leads to
the over-prediction of revisionist states, and Lyall counters that as revisionist states are less
common than the theory stipulates, scholars cannot simply call revisionist states realist and be
done with it.20 These conflicting views on Russian intentions have prompted several important
questions to be explored. First, to what extent is Russia a revisionist power? A corollary of this
question is, to what extent are “revisionist” and “status-quo” appropriate labels for Russian
behavior?
Even if neither the status-quo nor the revisionist labels fit perfectly, this paper suggests that
the labels can be treated as ideal-types to be used for interpreting Russian interaction with CIS
and Baltic states within the energy sphere. The breakup of the Soviet Union led to the formation
of bilateral trade agreements between individual countries and Russia. Because Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania were the first to leave the ruble zone in 1992 and orient themselves toward Europe
(both politically and economically), they incurred Western European prices for their natural gas

18

Lyall, “Paths of Ruin,” 239.
A.F.K Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980), 19–20, 23.
20
Lyall, “Paths of Ruin,” 45.
19
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and oil imports from Russia.21 The countries that remained, Belarus, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and
Moldova, for example, negotiated agreements with Moscow that assured them of subsidized
energy supplies (sometimes in exchange for free defense assistance or commercial goods). In the
1990s, Boris Yeltsin did not hesitate to use energy supplies as a measure of the Kremlin’s
(dis)satisfaction with various state policies. Cutting off gas supplies to the Baltics in 1990 for
declaring independence and then again in 1999 to pressure Lithuania into giving a Russian firm a
stake in its oil refinery are but two examples. For the most part, however, the former Soviet
republics were eager to trade their billion-dollar debts owed to Russia for cheap energy supplies
that were discounted as much as 60-70 percent of world market prices. At the same time, the
Russian leadership could count on firm support from the general public by keeping natural gas
prices artificially low, much to the chagrin of Gazprom, which struggled to make a domestic
profit. In 2007, Russia expended the second highest amount of energy subsidies in nonOrganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, $50 billion worth
in oil, gas, electricity and coal.22
This paper will address the status-quo/revisionist debate by placing it within the context of
Russia’s oil and gas policies, a treatment that has been undertaken by few scholars. Thus, several
more questions need to be answered: is Russian domination of its natural resources unique
among states? How are Russian oil and natural gas prices decided? Are Russian actions uniform,
or do price discrepancies emerge based on identity politics? This paper seeks to determine
whether Russian elimination of domestic and foreign subsidies constitutes a political decision
meant to punish pro-democratic countries, or whether it is redolent of a desire to normalize
energy machinations between states. I argue that first, it is natural for Russia to seek regional

21
22

Rawi Abdelal, National Purpose in World Economy, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 49.
International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2008, 62. Note: all dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars.
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hegemony and fulfill its role as a realist state. Indeed, “Russia is a logical contender to play the
role of economic hegemon in the region, given the historical legacy, the size of its market, its
rich endowment with natural resources, and its diversified commercial ties.”23 Second, Russia’s
elimination of energy subsidies is neither revisionist nor unique. Its pipeline negotiations with its
neighbors, previously derided for their blatant political motivations, have acceded to neo-liberal
institutionalist principles as gas prices have normalized over the past nine years. Moreover,
Russia can be compared with other emerging powers whose national oil companies are used to
profit the state. Most importantly, in spite of different historical relations with Russia and
different degrees of dependence on Russian energy resources, the three "most different" cases
examined in this paper reflect similar patterns of bargaining over oil and gas prices and similar
shifts that bring each country’s prices closer to "normal" world market levels. Therefore, this
paper is intended partly as a corrective to the sensationalistic treatments of Russian actions in
this arena.
II. Hypothesis-Generating Study
As the global consumption of natural gas increased from 1 percent in 2000 to 2.5 percent in
2007, it became evident that Russia would continue to play a large role in the export of natural
gas and oil to its CIS, Baltic and European neighbors.24 Russia possesses 1/3 of the world’s
natural gas reserves, 1/10 of its oil reserves and supplies Europe with 25 percent of its natural gas
needs.25 Diversifying away from Russian energy imports is a possibility some European
countries are exploring, but such an activity is at once both expensive and difficult. Shifting

23

Andrei P. Tsygankov, "Vladimir Putin's Vision of Russia as Normal Great Power," Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 21,
no. 2 (April-June 2005), 152.
24
Gazprom in Figures, 2003 – 2007, (Moscow: Gazprom 2008), 5.
25
Gazprom Annual Report, Shareholder’s Meeting, June 30, 2006. Accessed at:
http://www.gazprom.com//eng/articles/article20334.shtml
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dependence onto Iran is a repugnant option in light of its nuclear capabilities, and importing
more natural gas and oil from Central Asia will be complicated, as most of its pipelines traverse
Russian territory. It is clear that discussions of energy security within the Eurasian and Caspian
regions could not take place without the inclusion of Russia as a prominent factor. Russia’s
humiliation after the Cold War and the chaotic nature of the Yeltsin years have no doubt eased
the way for restorationist sentiment: the re-emergence of Russia as an important power player in
geopolitics. But the national self-image of Russia attaining its former heights is less frightening
than has been predicted. The current debate regarding this phoenix-from-the-ashes centers on
Russian neo-imperialist and expansionist tendencies, without giving much credence to the actual
economic theory and practices underlying Russian decisions. Transferring the focus from
geopolitics to geoeconomics can shape how Russia is likely to be perceived by its Western
counterparts. Through no fault of its own, Russia’s interactions thus far have cemented its
reputation as a risky business partner that “would not hesitate to cut off energy to the Baltic
states.”26 But as the 2008 Russo-Georgian war displayed, Russia ignored a perfect opportunity to
destroy the Baku-Tbisili-Ceyhan pipeline that delivers gas from Central Asia to Western Europe.
Sabotaging the pipeline would have increased Europe’s dependence on Russian gas imports, and
Russia’s restraint signaled the extent to which economics supersedes politics. The message was
clear: “the energy business is too serious to expose it to the risks of local wars.”27 This paper
seeks to champion that viewpoint by offering an alternative explanation for the Russian
elimination of subsidies and its periodic gas-flow interruptions, an explanation that makes
Russian behavior in the energy sphere less revisionist than often assumed.
26

Keith C. Smith, “Russia Energy Politics in the Baltics, Belrus and Ukraine: A New Stealth Imperialism?”
(Washington: CSIS, 2004), 28.
27
Pavel K. Baev, “Russia Makes a Move in the Caucasus – and Looks Beyond,” Working Paper, Research Council
of Norway, accessed at: http://www.fni.no/russcasp/Russia-Caucasus-Iran-2008_BAEV_WP.pdf
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To demonstrate that Russia is raising prices for all of its trade partners regardless of political
orientation, I will examine three countries with which it conducts regular energy negotiations:
Lithuania, Azerbaijan and Belarus. While there are plenty of countries from which to choose,
these three represent the best sample across the region for several reasons. First, in order to
advance the claim that Russia’s implementation of market policies is without political
motivation, I will show that each country is experiencing the same trend. I therefore have chosen
three countries that have had historically different relationships with Moscow and continue to
experience different levels of cooperation with the former center today (See Figure 1).
Figure 1. Historical variations with Moscow:
Worst Relations

Lithuania

Best Relations

Azerbaijan

Belarus

The “most different” systems analysis centers on countries that diverge widely on two main
variables: the history of relations with Moscow and the level of dependence on Russian energy
supplies. All three countries have varying levels of closeness and varying levels of dependence,
but all have experienced a similar pattern of negotiation and pricing. The traditional model that
has been continually espoused in the media and within academia suggests that Moscow seeks to
impose its control on states that have tried to escape its clutches; in this case, Lithuania.
Conversely, extending the logic would indicate that Belarus, due to the younger-brother-esque
relationship seen between current president Alexander Lukashenko and Putin, would expect to
receive ideal pricing conditions that do not fluctuate. Yet these two hypotheticals do not hold
true when they are measured against the pattern Moscow has sought to install in the region.
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Because all three countries have had their natural gas and/or oil prices raised since 2002, they
provide an excellent springboard from which to assess Moscow’s policies toward its former
compatriots. In addition, the pricing disputes that have arisen between Moscow and each of the
countries stem from several sources: the refusal of the recipient or transit country to pay the
terms previously-negotiated, the piling up of energy debt as a result of inability to pay market
level prices, or failure to exchange energy debts for Gazprom’s stake in downstream oil refinery
and distribution companies.28 This paper will suggest that the disputes were unaffected by the
political developments simultaneously taking place. While energy security undoubtedly retains a
position every politician’s agenda, at least within the region under discussion, I argue that the
pricing wars that occurred between Gazprom and each of the three governments took place on
commercial grounds, not political ones.
Another reason these countries may be usefully compared has to do with their degrees of
dependence on Moscow. Because Azerbaijan does not display what Joseph Nye calls
“vulnerability interdependence,” and thus was able to refuse to buy gas from Moscow after
prices rose in 2007, it is different from both Lithuania and Belarus, which are much more
dependent upon Moscow for its natural gas exports and do not have the same luxury to diversify
their energy portfolio. Though Lithuania obtains 83 percent of its electricity from its nuclear
power plant, it is still reliant on Moscow for 90 percent of its oil needs. Both Belarus and
Lithuania are connected to Russia via pipelines and both retain weak bargaining positions. Yet,
contrary to what the media reports, Belarus has been able to extract concessions from Russia
because the pipeline that runs through it transports gas to Poland and Germany. Thus Russia is
dependent upon Belarus for transit and also suffers when pricing disputes are unable to get
resolved. Examining Russian actions toward these countries in light of their varying levels of
28

Jonathan Stern, The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 105.
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dependence would be one way to assess whether Russia’s energy policies maximize profits, not
politics.
The three countries’ histories collectively provide rich examples of oil and natural gas
negotiations with Russia that have been misrepresented in academic writing and in the press.
This paper endeavors to scrutinize them more closely to ascertain Gazprom’s economic motives
in shutting off the gas. Because gas disruptions cause Gazprom billions of dollars in both profit
and contract violation fees with its European customers, it is less eager to stop supply than has
been portrayed. Indeed, Gazprom must earn back the fixed costs of building the pipelines, as it is
“not economically or commercially possible to generate the investment for such costly
infrastructure without robust arrangements for recouping it.”29
This paper will investigate the period from 2000-2008 under the leadership of Putin and his
successor, Dmitri Medvedev, who came to power in March 2008.30 The inclusion of the Yeltsin
era would not be useful given the fluidity of both ownership structures and systems of production
and pricing during the 1992-99 period. While the discussion of each country’s relations with
Moscow will reference the energy machinations in the 1990s under Yeltsin, it is more useful to
keep the sample period limited to the 2000-08 era as this is when a national energy strategy went
into effect.
In compiling these case studies, I will employ several methods of inquiry to ensure
qualitative completeness. Process tracing, or the analysis of historical method, will entail the
study of annual reports and shareholders’ meetings minutes from Gazprom, original national
29

Alexander Medvedev, “Is Gazprom’s strategy political?” Europe’s World 9 (2008): 64.
For the purposes of this thesis, I am assuming a diarchic system in which Medvedev and Putin share power. As
the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept was introduced as a supplement to the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept, I am
assuming continuities between Putin’s and Medvedev’s leadership. In addition, the 2003 Energy Strategy document
applies until late 2009, at which point a new policy will be introduced. Analysts predict it will barely deviate from
its predecessor. Unless Medvedev attempts to separate his own policy path, this thesis makes no distinction between
the two leaders’ regional oil and gas policies.
30
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energy strategies from Russia and Lithuania, and other records from policy makers. Macrohistorical analysis will inform the discussion of how original subsidies came into existence and
how their eradication has become politicized. Congruence procedures, “which evaluate the
consistency between evolution of independent and dependent variables within each case,” will
contribute to a framework that examines countries with difficult relations with Moscow and
their resultant energy prices.31 Statistics obtained from government websites as well as from the
International Energy Agency will allow us to locate the debate within the wider context of
international political economy. Ultimately, the lens of energy security policies will hone and
sharpen the point of inquiry to ensure general ideas about statist revision are applied to areas
other than military capacity.
III. Background of Russian energy policy and its adaptations
In August 1989, the Soviet Ministry of the Gas Industry was converted into a state-owned
corporation called Gazprom that extracted and exported natural gas. It became a private joint
stock company in 1992 under Yeltsin and allowed members of the public to purchase shares.
While the state allowed Gazprom to remain intact, the Soviet Ministry of Fuel and Energy
became a joint stock company called Rosneftegaz, which was then split up into several smaller
companies such as LUKoil and Yukos.32 Throughout the 1990s, none of the ventures made
much profit, as world market oil and natural gas prices were low and revenues barely covered the
cost of transportation, exploration and distribution. The devaluation of the Russian ruble and
subsequent bankruptcy of the Russian government in 1998 further exacerbated the situation.
By 2000, however, due to rising demand from countries like China and India, gas and oil
prices began to rise. With the election of Putin to the presidency, oil strategy experienced a
31

Adam Stulberg, Well-Oiled Diplomacy: Strategic Manipulation and Russia’s Energy Statecraft in Eurasia, (New
York: State University of New York Press, 2007), 6.
32
Marshall L. Goldman, Petrostate, (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2008), 60.
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significant shift toward “aggressive opportunism.” Putin “actively wooed business deals for
Russian firms while fueling commercial and political uncertainty to discourage foreign rivals.”33
While foreigners had previously been able to own shares in Gazprom, a ring fence around the
company was set up to encourage domestic investment and maintain the state’s control. By 2005,
the state’s shares had reached 50.002 percent, making it the majority shareholder and necessarily
redefining Gazprom strategy to fulfill its fiduciary duty to the state. With regards to oil
production, in 2000 the state’s share of total crude oil production was 16 percent and by late
2007 it had increased to about 50 percent.34 Coupled with the state’s increasing power over the
natural gas and oil industries was the realization that the days of cheap gas had to come to an
end. In 2005, for example, Gazprom lost eight billion rubles from subsidized deliveries to the
domestic market.35 Recognizing the need to make a profit and reallocate those funds to areas
such as field exploration, the government issued its 2003 Energy Strategy, which emphasized the
need to transition to market prices for both domestic and foreign markets. Gazprom, apparently
relieved that its 2004 and 2005 Annual Reports were having an effect upon government policy,
reiterated its position in its 2008 report. “Maintaining the predominant position of Russian
natural gas in the energy sector” was key, and the way to accomplish this task was to “adjust the
existing agreements in order to move to contractual terms and conditions as well as pricing
mechanisms similar to those affective in European countries.”36
Because the government stopped regulating the price of coal and other fuels in the 1990s, but
has kept natural gas prices artificially low since then, domestic industrial and household
consumers now comprise the most natural-gas-consuming-economy in the world. The share of
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natural gas in Russia’s energy demand pattern grew dramatically from 42.1 percent in 1990 to
48.1 percent in 2007, forcing Gazprom to re-examine its market strategy.37 Energy-saving
techniques have become noncompetitive because gas is so plentiful, and in order for Gazprom to
meet demand, it must produce 14 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year.38 Economic Development
trade minister German Gref reportedly expressed worry that Gazprom would be unable to keep
up with growing demand if it failed to invest in new projects.39Consequently, the company must
look to other areas of exploration, as its four main fields have declined in production in recent
years. As part of its new strategy, Gazprom received permission to enact gas floors and ceilings
in 2007 for industrial consumers, who may choose the price at which to supply provided it falls
within the two bands.40 By 2011, Gazprom will be able to charge market prices to industrial
consumers.41
Actions toward leveling the playfield in foreign markets have mirrored the steps taken to
eliminate subsidies in the domestic realm. As early as 2001, former Minister of Defence Sergei
Ivanov heralded Russia’s new approach to the problems posed by its interactions with CIS states.
In 2000, debts incurred by the Commonwealth of Independent States (a group formed of
countries formed after the breakup of the Soviet Union) amounted to $5.5 billion, which led
Ivanov to call for economic pragmatism predicated upon the market, not privileges.42 Because
Putin wished to discontinue subsidizing energy exports, even to nations with which Russia had a
cooperative relationship, in December 2005 the government announced price increases for
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Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armeni and Georgia, as “all relations with CIS were to be built
on a sound economic reason.”43
In early 2007, Dmitri Medvedev continued this trend when he told the World Economic
Forum in Davos that “being a part of the world economy … means there will be no more natural
free gas for anyone.”44 In April 2008, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced that within two
to three years, Russia expected to export natural gas and oil to every country at market prices. He
also stated that the share of Russian gas on the market would increase from the current 26
percent to 33-35 percent by 2020.45 Wishing to capitalize on this larger role within the European
market, Gazprom announced in July 2008 that it would raise prices for CIS, Baltic and Western
European countries across the board.46 This trajectory demonstrates the Kremlin’s economic
planning and its centrality within Russian foreign policy. The continued attempts to phase out
subsidies for domestic and foreign markets over the past nine years display the unshaken resolve
of the Russian government to adhere to a free-market, capitalist system.
The Foreign Policy Concepts of 2000 and 2008 propose the international role the government
envisions for the country: how it will conduct itself with its neighbors and how it expects to be
perceived by other states. In the Foreign Policy Concept of June 28, 2000, Section 2 reads: “The
Russian Federation is pursuing an independent and constructive foreign policy. It is based on
[…] mututally advantageous pragmatism. This policy … takes into consideration the legitimate
interests of other states and is aimed at seeking joint decisions.” Shortly after, Section 3 puts
forth its “main priority in international economic relations,” which “promote[s] development of
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the national economy, unthinkable without broad integration of Russia in the system of world
economic ties.”47 This document was signed into law by Putin himself, who had been in office
just over six months when the concept was introduced. Positioning itself as an arbiter of disputes
within its immediate neighborhood, Russia stood to benefit from the quiet patriotism latent
within the text. More specifically, the government could advance its national interests while
remaining respectful of the international organizations from which it could benefit.
The Foreign Policy Concept of 2008 advances these basic premises but intensifies the
language to better express Russia’s presence within the new world order as well as its dominion
in the Eurasian energy sector. Section II describes Russia “as a country possessing major
potential and significant resources in all spheres of human activities” and as a country that
“exerts a substantial influence upon the development of a new architecture of international
relations.”48 Cognizant of the ramifications of its actions toward its neighbors, the government
could elevate the country’s status as a major world power, at least on paper. Moreover, Section
III, part 4 mentions energy supplies specifically, stressing the need to guarantee reliability,
stability of demand and secure transit. This is followed by a description of Russia’s trade with
the CIS, which “takes into consideration market principles […] an important condition for
promoting truly equal relationship.”49 The relationship with the CIS had been mentioned in the
2000 document, but the extent to which it is outlined here indicates its increasing importance in a
world in which Russia functions as a reliable energy supplier. Ultimately, it is this nexus of
Russia’s self-image, adherence to free market principles and interactions with the Near Abroad
that informs the issue at hand. Russia can pose as a major world power because its energy
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machinations provide the confidence to do so. But it is important to consider that though Russia
wants to re-emerge as a great power on the world stage, it is not willing to topple the entrenched
system to do so. Rather, the Foreign Policy documents identify the influence Russia retains and
will continue to retain within its backyard. When understood in the context of Russian energy
policy, the documents illuminate how Russia interacts with the three countries that will be
examined in the next section.
IV. Case Studies
A. Lithuania
Of the three cases to be examined in this paper, Lithuania has had the most difficult
relationship with Russia. The tension between the two countries can be traced to nationalism and
identity politics that emerged in the 20th century and led Lithuania to declare its independence.
Collectively, the three Baltic states have been aggressive and confident in their energy
negotiations with Moscow. But Lithuania’s failure to distance itself from post-Communist
asymmetrical trading manifests itself in its extreme dependence upon Russia for natural gas and
oil. Due to its early experiences with statehood and the construction of a national memory
alluding to an idealized myth of a homeland, Lithuania wanted to guarantee its political and
economic independence from Moscow. This sentiment, coupled with the merging of Communist
party elites and dedicated Sajudis reformers, encouraged the formation of national identity that
still fears Russian dominance and interference.
i. Lithuanian – Russian Relations in Historical Perspective
Lithuania once formed part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that dated back to
1386 before being absorbed into the Russian empire in 1795. This absorption prompted the first
stirrings of distrust toward Russia and her progeny and supplied the historical roots for
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contemporary Lithuanian apprehension toward the state.50 In the 1880s, the intellectual elite
created publications that reflected the first mobilized feelings of nationalism. Because the
journals were confined to the intelligentsia, however, grassroots efforts to generate enthusiasm
for a state were practically nonexistent. In 1905, in light of the October Revolution occurring
across the border in Russia, the elites demanded an autonomous zone that would function
independently on a local level but still remain part of the tsarist empire. Their request was largely
ignored, but the geospatial events of World War I would give rise to the notion of independent
statehood, albeit for a limited existence. In 1915, the Germans occupied Vilnius. Two years later,
the local government announced an alliance with Germany. By 1919, however, the Soviet Union
had established the Lithuanian-Belorussian Soviet Republic in Vilnius. A Polish victory against
Russia in the Polish-Bolshevik war led to a power vacuum in 1920, and, largely as an accident,
Lithuania had its first brief flirtation with the establishment of an independent state, which
resulted from “German eastern diplomacy, weakness of Russian state and British policies in the
Baltic region.”51
During the interwar period, cultural awareness flourished and Lithuanian nationalism spread.
After the Soviet Union recognized Lithuania and signed a peace treaty, the standardization of
culture, language and education meant new generations of children would grow up speaking a
the Lithuanian dialect. The interwar state “provided the political space within which Lithuanian
national identity, promoted by an independent government, first became widely shared among
the population.”52 In the 1990s, the glorification of a homeland was predicated upon this first
experience of independence.
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In the late 1930s, the cultural flowering taking place came to an abrupt end. The RibbentropMolotov Pact, signed between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, annexed the three Baltic
states to the Soviet sphere of influence in 1940. Though still an issue of great debate today, as the
Russian government refuses to admit the states were forced to join, it set the precedent for the
intense anti-Russian sentiment that flowed through several generations of Lithuanians. The
Soviet Union occupied Lithuania in June 1940 and incorporated it into its empire as a constituent
republic two months later. Following the 1940 annexation, the process of Sovietization
effectively demolished most Lithuanian cultural hubs. Soviet laws replaced Lithuanian ones and
mass deportations fulfilled the Soviets’ goal of ridding the country of political dissenters and
bourgeois nationalists. Indeed, the Sovietization process attempted to force the integration of the
Lithuanian Soviet Republic into the Soviet Union by denationalizing Lithuanian identity,
introducing a command economy and eliminating civil society entirely.53
The introduction of a command economy strengthened the connection between the peripheral
republics and the center in Moscow. With Lithuanian territory fully ensconced within the Soviet
sphere, the Soviet government began efforts to supply the constituency with cheap natural gas,
thereby instituting the cycle of energy debt that chained Lithuania to the empire for so long. The
first natural gas shipment arrived in 1961 from Western Ukraine and the Soviets completed the
Druzhba (‘Friendship’) oil pipeline by 1968. The pipeline began at Polotsk in Belorussia and
ended at the port of Ventspils, Latvia. A refinery was built at Mazeikiai in Lithuania to process
the crude oil shipments. While this process invariably increased dependence upon the Soviet
Union54, it also stimulated domestic industry, particularly the growth of the chemical industry
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that produced fertilizers.55 The rapid economic growth in the 1960s gave way to stagnation in the
1970s and 80s, when product shortages became more common and Lithuanians had money
burning in their pockets. The economic situation thus increased frustration at the “exploitation by
the center,” a feeling that would eventually crystallize into outright resentment. Fearful of losing
its grip upon the republic, the Kremlin embarked upon a path of Russification, replacing
Lithuanian with Russian as the new language of government and business in 1978.56 In 1979,
emboldened by the world’s reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Lithuanian dissidents
issued the usual calls for human rights and religious freedoms, but went further than before in
demanding outright independence, the publication of the actual text of the Ribbentrop-Molotov
pact, and the withdrawal of all Soviet soldiers from Baltic states. Their pleas went unanswered at
the time, but the movement slowly gained momentum in the 1980s, as the center decided the
Baltic states were ideal candidates to experiment with a system of local self-governance while
remaining under the auspices of the Soviet Union. It is due to the economic success of the 70s
that the Soviets decided their experiment in the Baltics, a reason that gave Lithuanians hope that
their eventual state could maintain fiscal responsibility in the wake of a Soviet departure.
Borrowing an idea that Estonia had proposed in 1987, the Soviets agreed to an introduction of
local self-rule commencing in 1990. Gorbachev, realizing the political and economic
implications such a plan would have for the strength of the Union, recast the proposal and
removed the republics’ right to secede under Article 72 of the Soviet constitution. Reforms were
well and good, he believed, but only when carried out by the central administration.57
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Shortly after perestroika and glasnost were introduced in 1987, Lithuanian intellectuals
established the Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring, known as Sajudis. They proposed
greater Lithuanian autonomy and eventually merged with the Communist Party of Lithuania
(CPL). In March 1989, the Soviets held elections to the All Union Soviet Congress of People’s
Deputies and Sajudis won 36 out of 42 electoral districts. By December 1989, Sajudis called for
a break with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the CPL renamed itself the
Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDDP). When the Supreme Soviet voted 124-0 to declare
independence in April 1990, Gorbachev cut off the oil and gas for the first time, successfully
using energy as a blunted foreign policy tool. The disruption didn’t last, however, and in August
1991, Gorbachev resigned and the Soviet Union recognized Lithuania’s independence.58
Once Lithuania received its independence, it moved very quickly to extricate itself from the
shadow cast by the Iron Curtain. Identifying its economic dependence on Russia as the primary
security threat, it sought to paint itself as an extension of Europe and thus a natural choice to
acquiesce to Europe’s supranational institutions. Diversifying its trade links, then, was
imperative for attaining Lithuania’s ultimate foreign goal: joining the European Union. In June
1992, the Lithuanian parliament ratified the Constitutional Act on Nonalignment of the Republic
of Lithuania to Post Soviet Eastern Alliance, which proclaimed that the state would “never and in
no way join any new political, military, economic or any other state alliances or commonwealths
formed on the basis of the former USSR.” Still sensitive from the economic blockade of 1990,
Lithuania reluctantly agreed to a system of barter agreements with Russia in 1992. By April
1993, Russia agreed to trade energy materials such as diesel, natural gas and fuel in exchange for
meat and milk products from Lithuania.59 It was understood, however, that these agreements
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were meant to be temporary in nature, as Lithuania further incurred Russian displeasure when it
opted to issue its own currency in May 1992 and exit the ruble zone in October of the same year.
As a result, Russia decided to raise gas prices for the three Baltic states in May 1993. The
increase to market prices was set to occur gradually over the decade, but the ensuing deals made
between the Russian government and individual states detracted from such a goal.
Meanwhile, Lithuania turned its attention toward ingratiating itself with the West. It signed a
free trade agreement with the EU in 1994, became an associate member in 1998 and issued an
action program based on “merging into the European market of goods and capital” in 1997.60 It
refused to award Russia Most Favored Nation trade status, a typical attribute of bilateral treaties,
until 1995. From 1998 to 1999, Transneft, a state oil company, cut off the oil supply to Lithuania
nine times in an attempt to force Lithuania to cede control of its oil refinery and port terminal to
LUKoil. This is a clear example of the Kremlin using energy as a political tool, and serves as a
comparison for how Russian government has conducted relations with Lithuania since then.
While it continued to receive discounts on energy supplies, though not at CIS prices, Lithuania’s
decision to forgo Russian patronage and cheap gas prices was reflective of its desire to separate
itself once and for all.
ii. Current oil and gas machinations with Russia
Lithuanian actions in the post-Soviet space depict a clear preference for association with
Europe, especially in light of its ascension to the EU in 2004. Since that year, it has become
embroiled in a series of commercial disputes with Russia as gas prices have risen to almost
Western European levels. While the Russo-Lithuanian relationship is fraught with distrust and
exasperation on behalf of both sides, the Lithuanians are too quick to interpret Russian actions as
political retribution. Indeed, “it has become extremely difficult for many not to ascribe
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underlying imperialist designs in virtually any and all Russian moves.”61 Such simplistic
perceptions engender further misunderstanding and exculpate states, in this case, Lithuania, from
carrying out fiscal responsibility.
By claiming that Russian elimination of subsidies is punishment for Lithuanian integration
into the West, Lithuania presents a compelling narrative that is, for the most part, largely
accepted without question by the international community. That Lithuania’s credibility in the
international arena seems to increase each time it accuses Russia of politicizing a gas dispute is
suspect. A central reason for the world’s apparent willingness to take Lithuania’s side, regardless
of how exaggerated its claims may be, stems from the inherent biases of Western nations toward
democratic states. Keith Smith writes that “a more democratic Russia would likely have more
respect for the sovereignty and aspirations of its neighbors.”62 This observation is flawed in three
ways. First, he assumes that Russian actions are centered on threatening the sovereignty of
neighboring nations. But cutting off the gas supply as a result of intractable price discussions has
little to do with undermining a nation’s self-determination. He then erroneously infers that
democracies handle business decisions differently (more ethically?) than do authoritarian
nations. Vietnam functions as an appropriate counterexample, as its increasingly authoritarian
regime has maintained financial growth and stability free from scrutiny over the past several
years. Smith also disregards Russian aspirations in his resolve to defend the Baltic states. Why
should Russia not have the same opportunity to maximize profit and increase revenues? For that
matter, why does he exonerate Lithuania, though it too participated in a seemingly irresolvable
standoff over prices? He later contends that “Europe could be less concerned if Russia were
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rapidly moving in the direction of Western-style diplomacy.”63 That Russia is moving in the
direction of free-market economies, a staple of Western-style democracies, seems to have evaded
his attention.
Natural gas is exported to the Baltic states based on long-term contracts that extend until
2015. Since the early 2000s, when Gazprom redefined its strategy to equalize domestic and
foreign revenues, it has sought to “[bring] the prices charged for the gas sold in CIS and Baltic
states up to a balanced level (adjusted to the transportation distance) with gas prices charged
from its European customers.”64 Lithuania comprised 3.4 percent of Gazprom’s sales to CIS and
Baltic countries in 2007.65 While it provides significantly less revenue than Ukraine and Belarus,
Lithuania still remains an important customer, as it is entirely dependent on Gazprom for its
natural gas needs. Its energy strategy, which was updated in 2003 in preparation for the country’s
ascension to the EU, states bluntly that “energy supply is vulnerable.” As such, the document
places a premium on finding alternative methods to import and/or suppliers of natural gas.66 As
Figure 2 demonstrates, however, Lithuania has increased its annual imports:

Figure 2. Lithuanian gas imports from Russia, 2000 – 200467:
Year

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Total bcm

2.57

2.8

2.7

2.9

2.93

Lithuania is unlikely to diversify away from Russian natural gas and oil imports any time soon,
and accordingly, the increasing gas prices over time have caused yearly spats between the
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country and Russia. Gazprom ownership in national gas or oil ventures has also prompted some
controversy. In 2002, for example, Lithuania wanted to prevent Gazprom from buying more
shares in the national natural gas company, Lietuvos Dujos. To combat this, Gazprom
established Dujotekana, a local subsidiary, and acquired 30 percent of the gas marketing
company Stella Vitae. By the following year, Dujotekana had taken 60 percent of the gas market
from Lietuvos Dujos. Lithuania then decided to sell more equity in Lietuvos Dujos to Gazprom,
which increased its shares to 37 percent.68 While this business venture is clearly one of ruthless
coercion on behalf of Gazprom, it was not informed by political motives. Gazprom does not care
who is in office or to whom it sells gas; as long as it makes a profit, the company is willing to do
business with any country.
Lithuanian consumers were impacted 2004 when Gazprom ceased deliveries to Belarus as a
result of pricing disagreements. While some immediately decried Russia for directly affecting
European consumers, the stoppage is more to Gazprom’s detriment than to any other party’s. The
EU depends on Russia for a quarter of its natural gas consumption, but Gazprom depends on the
EU for 70 percent of its export earnings.69 Gazprom’s designation of Europe as a focal point of
its business expansion strategy speaks to the seriousness with which it approaches long-term gas
and oil contracts: “in the mid term, we continue to regard Europe as the most important market
despite the European Commission's plans to develop alternative energy,” Gazprom CEO Alexei
Miller stated in 2008.70 Arbitrarily shutting off the gas would be a foolish decision for a
company trying to maximize its relationship with Europe and build new pipelines. Simply put,
there is no room for Russian energy blackmail within this economic context. During the gas
stoppage in February 2004, the Russians made certain to deliver 5 million bcm to Lithuania from
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the Latvian Inchukalinskoye UGS facility, even though there were no gas metering stations at the
site to prevent gas from being siphoned off illegally.71 Realizing Lithuania had become
inextricably caught up in another country’s pricing dispute, Russia attempted to ameliorate the
situation by providing whatever supplies it could from another route. Instead of punishing
Lithuania for joining the EU that year by withholding gas, Gazprom instead found other means
to follow through on its contractual obligation to the country. In 2004, the Baltic states paid an
average $83.52 per mcm of natural gas.72 That same year, Gazprom announced it would raise
prices in 2005, a move that international audiences interpreted to be punitive as Lithuania had
just joined the EU. But the news was not greeted with a large amount of surprise or criticism in
the Baltic press as the increase had been expected.
In May 2006, Lithuania and Russia clashed once again. The Russian oil company LUKoil,
Russian-British hybrid TNK-BP and Polish energy company PKN Orlen submitted bids at an
auction to purchase the Lithuanian government’s 30.66 percent stake of Mazeikiu Nafta, an oil
refinery company. PKN Orlen submitted the highest bid, the other two companies were
unwilling to match the price, and so the Polish company was set to buy the stake in Mazeikiu
Nafta in December 2006. The Russian government was annoyed at this outcome and tried to
prevent the transfer of power to the Polish, but failed to secure ownership of the stake. On July
29, 2006, Transneft halted supplies to the Druzhba pipeline, citing environmental and safety
concerns due to a leak the pipeline had sprung in the Russian region of Bryansk.73 The
Lithuanians were outraged, immediately linking the decision to halt supplies with Russia’s desire
to gain ownership of the stake in Mazeikiu Nafta and prevent the Polish deal from occurring. But
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“though Lithuanian politicians and analysts were quick to decry the development as a ploy by
Russia, which [was] still angered at being shut out of the refinery's recent sale,”74 it is important
to note that the pipeline had been constructed nearly forty years before and had sprung leaks in
other parts. After a study was conducted in the fall and 8,000 defects were found by the Russian
Federal Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Oversight Service, Russia decided to cease
deliveries all together for up to a year, until the pipeline could be fixed. It was then decided that
the pipeline was beyond repair.75 Russia promised, however, to deliver crude oil from the sea
port of Sochi to compensate for the absence of the pipeline, which increased the cost of oil by $8
per ton. Though the Lithuanian Economy Minister himself, Vytas Navickas, cited the technical
nature of the problem, several newspapers and analysts denounced Russia for “us[ing] economic
leverage to force an outcome of its liking.”76 In response to the Russian refusal to fix the
pipeline, the Lithuanian government vetoed cooperation talks between Russia and the European
Commission for two years, only lifting its ban in May 2008.77
As the dispute over the Polish stake in Mazeikiu Nafta unfolded, Gazprom made good on its
promise to raise Baltic prices to world market levels. In November 2006, the company
announced a gas hike from the 2006 price of $110/mcm to a 2007 average price of $260/mcm.78
In January 2007, Lithuania paid $202/mcm (in contrast to the Europeans, who paid $260/mcm),
but the price rose several months after to $260/mcm.79 By June 2008, Lithuania was paying
$400/mcm, figures higher than had been predicted in December 2007, which projected imports
costing $363/mcm. Figure 3 charts the increase in prices from 2004 through 2008.
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Figure 3. Lithuanian prices for natural gas imports from Russia, 2004 – 200880
Year

2004

2006

2007

2008

Price in
USD/mcm

83.52

110

260

400

The rise in Lithuanian’s gas price is consistent with the philosophy underpinning Gazprom’s
strategy in the Baltic states: the gradual transition to market prices in order to compensate for the
profits lost on the domestic market. The nationalist sentiment that characterized Lithuania’s
secession from the Soviet Union and the subsequent distrust of Russia’s pipeline monopoly in
the region may have contributed to how Lithuanians view their former overseer. But Lithuania’s
orientation toward the West had little bearing upon commercial transactions that were rooted in
making profits for a company bent on besting veritable American giants such as Chevron and
Mobil. Furthermore, Gazprom’s decision to raise prices annually were neither out-of-the-blue
nor deviously-arranged. Lithuanian trade ministers held multiple talks with Gazprom once the
company announced its intentions; withholding gas and oil was thus a response to technical
issues as opposed to deep-seated political divergences.
B. Azerbaijan
i. Azeri – Russian Relations in Historical Perspective
Russia’s oil and natural gas meddling in Azerbaijian began in the early 1990s, with the
discovery of extensive oil fields in the Soviet Union’s backyard. But its empire over Central Asia
and the Caucasus, formally known as Turkestan and Transcaspia, dates back to the 19th
century.81 Azerbaijan’s history is littered with conquests. First conquered by the Romans,
Persians, Arabs, Turks, Mongols, and Persians again, the territory was finally divided between
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Persia and Russia in the early to mid-nineteenth century. The Treaty of Turkmenchay established
new borders and removed from power the last dynasties of local Azerbaijani khanates. While it
did oscillate between dependency and colonial rule, Azerbaijan grew adept at concentrating
power within the local administration, as government and judicial powers were left in the hands
of the natives.82 From the mid-nineteenth century onward, cultural assimilation into the Russian
mainstream was relatively rare, as the mid-level bureaucracy was selected from the Azeri
constituency. After WWI and following the 1917 October Revolution, the country enjoyed a
brief two years of self-determination. The Red Army then invaded in 1920 and Azerbaijan was
joined with the USSR in the Transcaucasus Republic in 1922. In the 1920s, under the Soviet
policies of nationalist localization, “alphabet reform and secularism broadened the Azeri
development into a nation,”83 but in 1936, it became a Soviet Republic, useful to the Russians for
its oil and gas resources in several offshore fields.84
Under Stalin’s 1936 constitution, Azerbaijan became a Soviet Republic but, in accordance
with Russian nationalism policies, developed local culture and built up its elite. By the 1930s,
Azerbaijan had experienced anti-Islamism, collectivization, and industrialization in the cities. In
1936, it was upgraded to a constituent republic in order for the center to exert the greatest
influence upon its activities. A vertical chain of command, instead of a horizontal identification
of culture with other republics, set the historical precedent for future Azeri-Russian relations.85
The 1937 purges that spread across the Soviet Union reached the Azeri borders, but the arrests,
mass deportations and executions were based on charges such as “Pan-Turkism” and “Pan
Islamism.” Much like the manifestation of its anti-Semitic policies, the state under Stalin (and
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beyond his rule) prosecuted Muslims and took the side of Christians in its local skirmishes, most
notably within the Azeri-Armenian conflict.
By the early 1990s, Azerbaijan’s relationship with Moscow was neither entirely hostile nor
completely friendly. The conflict with Armenia had encouraged the formation of political
groups, and in the beginning, Moscow refrained from supporting either side. In January 1990,
however, the civil war led to the flight of the Armenians from Baku, the capital, and the
intervention of Soviet soldiers, who stationed themselves around the city and wounded and killed
hundreds of Azeri citizens. The Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet passed a resolution calling for the
withdrawal of Soviet troops and the lifting of the Moscow-imposed state of emergency. At this
point, however, few calls for independence were made. Rather, the Azeris sought to minimize
Moscow’s influence while still remaining under its protection. The Communist party resurrected
itself in 1990 and roundly defeated the opposition Democrats, who garnered only 26 of 350
mandates.86 The leader of the Communists, Ayaz Mutalibov, was put in power by Moscow as the
new president in June 1990. Though the country announced its independence from the Soviet
Union on August 30, 1991, it was not meant to “lead to collision with SU as Russia [had] played
a positive role and offers huge markets.”87 Indeed, the speech announcing Azerbaijan’s
independence stressed the closeness of the two states and the Soviet Union’s role in shaping
Azeri national development.
In February 1992, Armenian and Russian forces took control of Khojali, a city in Azerbaijan,
and massacred over 600 Azeri citizens. Under pressure from the opposition group, the
Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF), Mutalibov stepped down as president for mismanagement of
the Khojali massacre. The Supreme Council of Azberbaijan reinstated Mutalibov after
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exonerating him from responsibility, but mass demonstrations led by APF forced him to flee to
Moscow, where he has resided since. The pro-Western chairman of the APF, Abulfaz Elcibey,
was elected president in June 1992 but was deposed after fleeing during another round of the
Azeri-Armenian conflict in June 1993. Heidar Aliev, the head of the Communist party, came to
power and ruled until October 2003, when his son, Ilham, succeeded him. Politically, the Alievs
have managed to remain integrated into both Eastern and Western spheres. The Azeri executive
branch has traditionally carried the most weight within government, much like the president’s
position in Russia. The authoritarian nature of Azerbaijan’s government complemented Yeltsin’s
political style, as he had originally carved out a super-presidentialist system to maintain stability.
Azerbaijan’s overtures to the West, in the form of oil agreements with multinational companies,
helped shield it from criticism pertaining to its less-than-stellar human rights record and active
repression of political dissenters. While Yeltsin’s meddling in the Azeri-Armenian wars was
meant to demonstrate to Azerbaijan the perils of looking toward the West, relations between the
two countries were never openly hostile. Azerbaijan meticulously balanced its new position in
the world order after 1991: it maintained a cordial relationship with Russia while reaching out to
Western powers in the1990s version of the “Great Game,” or the conquest of oil in the Caspian
Region.
Though the political dimension of the countries’ relationship was largely pleasant, the
economic interactions were more acrimonious. Upon his election, Elcibey immediately withdrew
the country from the CIS and introduced proposals that would bind the country closer with
Turkey and Europe. He introduced the Azeri currency, the manat, in August 1992 as a
supplement to the ruble, which was supposed to cease circulation on June 15, 1993. He left
office on June 13, however, and Aliev was less enthusiastic about abolishing the ruble, preferring
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to postpone the plan until July.88 Though Aliev was more pro-Russian than Elcibey, the country
was still ambiguous about its economic future and the extent to which it wanted to participate in
an alliance with Russia. For example, after Azerbaijan withdrew from the CIS, Russia retaliated
by raising import duties on industrial products to 65 percent.89 Aliev was especially aware of the
Russian interest in the emerging Azeri oil market. By the end of 1994, Russia had extended 5.9
billion credits to CIS countries; 2.8 billion credits made up energy supplies that had been
delivered at prices below world market level. After the dismantling of the ruble zone, Russia
warned it would raise energy prices in September 1993 to alleviate the accumulation of debts it
had encountered from virtually all of the CIS countries, which were billions of dollars in
arrears.90 Partnering with Azerbaijan proved a tempting offer for Russia, which would attempt to
protect its economic interests and maintain control over the lucrative oil industry.
Since 1992, Azerbaijan has focused on developing the country’s oil resources through the
exploration of its offshore fields in order to ensure its energy security. In September 1992, the
State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) was established with the merger of Azerineft and
Azneftkimiya, the country’s national oil companies. Since its inception, SOCAR has regularly
retained a 50 percent stake in its deals with foreign companies, as “oil has been the only viable,
export-capable economic lever independent Azerbaijan has known.”91 In September 1994, the
Azerbaijan International Operating Consortium (AIOC) signed “the Contract of the Century,” a
product sharing agreement (PSA) with foreign companies to invest about $11 billion in
developing Azeri and Chirag offshore fields over a 30-year span. Azerbaijan was the first post-
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Soviet state to sign PSA’s with foreign parties. Some of the companies that took part included
BP, Amoco, LUKoil and of course, Azeri state companies.92
In an effort to offset the influence foreigners would exert in the Caspian region, an area
Moscow considered under its oversight, Russia set about “maximizing the role for Russian
companies in the area, controlling oil transport out of the country, [and] using the uncertain legal
status of the Caspian Sea to prevent unilateral offshore oil developments.”93 After the demise of
the Soviet Union, five littoral states bordered the Caspian Sea: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia,
Turkmenistan and Iran. Despite numerous meetings and joint talks, the countries could not agree
as to how best to assign sovereignty over this body of water. Azerbaijan wanted to divide the sea
bottom into national zones, so as to have access to the oil at the bottom, while Russia supported
dividing only the seabed, leaving the bottom of sea free to explorers from any of the littoral
states.94 Irked by the combination of Azerbaijan’s assertive stance and its dealings with
foreigners, Russia issued a document entitled “Conceptual Provisions of the Strategy for
Counteraction of Major Threats to the National Security of the Russian Federation,” a part of
which read:
“The most important task is not allowing the realization of the Caspian oil contract in its
present form. In this case it would be expedient to implement a set of measures…including, if
necessary, the use of force in order to stop any activities of foreign companies in the former
Soviet part of the Caspian until its legal status is defined; to apply pressure on the Baku
regime, for example, by creating threats of fragmentation of Azerbaijan and Armenian
military offence.”95
Russia’s willingness to use force to protect its vital economic interests fulfills one definition of a
revisionist state. The country strove to make Azerbaijan aware of the consequences of preventing
Russia from attaining regional hegemony; it was willing to intervene more deeply in the Azeri92
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Armenian conflict to ensure its position in the Great Game. Two years later, Russia and
Azerbaijan signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation and security. The atmosphere was tense,
however, as Russia continued to display its support for Armenia by undertaking joint military
and naval exercises with Armenian forces near the Armenian-Turkish border. Compounding
Russia’s insecurity was the introduction of the United States and other Western powers into the
Caspian region. By the late 1990s, the Clinton administration had developed a policy to “contain
Russia, reward old and new allies such as Georgia and Azerbaijan, develop alternative energy
sources to reduce reliance on sources in the Middle East, and project U.S. influence into what by
then seemed to be a regional power vacuum.”96 Russia believed the U.S. wanted to prevent
Russian regional hegemony and concluded that Azerbaijan and the United States were colluding
to ensure it wouldn’t occur. Despite its uneasiness with the American presence in the region,
Russia was forced to moderate its aggressive position toward Azerbaijan by 2000, as it realized
its economy depended on a stable economic and political relationship with CIS countries.
ii. Current oil and gas machinations with Russia
Since Putin came to power in 2000, the Russian-Azerbaijani relationship has improved
considerably, though Azerbaijan still balances its interests against both those of Russia and the
Western powers. Due to its large reserves of natural gas and oil (17 percent of the world’s proven
oil reserves), the country has been better able to withstand pressure from the Kremlin regarding
its energy negotiations. Russia’s interest in the Caspian region has also changed slightly. Instead
of solely selling gas, Russia has contemplated buying gas from Azerbaijan at European prices.
This evolution is testament to Russia’s willingness to adhere to international norms and continue
the normalization of gas prices across CIS states. More specifically, “the play for Eurasian
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resources essentially boils down to commercial competition among energy companies and
financial interests.”97
Continuing the dialogue over the legal status of the Caspian Sea, in 2001 Putin traveled to the
region and signed a bilateral agreement that promised to expand economic relations with
Azerbaijan over the next decade. In 2002, the two countries signed an agreement demarcating
and assgining segments of the Caspian Sea. By May 2003, Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
had focused on deciding precisely the point at which their segments met, but Iran and
Turkmenistan disagreed with the measures to assign sovereignty over the body of water.
Undeterred, Putin conducted nine meetings with Azerbaijan through 2005, hoping to resolve the
issue. 2006 saw no breakthrough, but the level of engagement with the problem remains high on
both sides. Trade relations over oil and gas also improved in 2001. Agreements signed in
December of that year and renewed in 2002 and 2003 underlined Russian-Azerbaijani trade
cooperation and proposed more volumes of oil to be moved through the Baku- Novorossiysk
pipeline. While Azerbaijan did use the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline for several years, in 2007 it
rerouted its shipments through the Baku-Tbsili-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.
As Figure 4 indicates, from 2000-2003 Azerbaijian’s natural gas imports increased. And
although Azerbaijan began exporting its own gas with the development of its Shah Deniz oil
fields in 2006, its net consumption of 400 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas in 2006 and its
production of 350 bcf in 2007 still qualified the country as a net importer.98
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Figure 4. Azeri natural gas imports from Russia, 2000 – 200399
Year

2000

2001

2002

2003

Bcm

.26

3.1

3.9

4.1

Unlike Lithuania and Belarus, Azerbaijan is set to become a major oil and natural gas exporter
over the next several years. Growth from the Azer-Chirag-Guneshli field, which totaled 700,000
barrels of oil per day (bbl/d) in 2007, has facilitated Azerbaijan’s move toward energy
independence. SOCAR plans to invest $224 million to expand natural gas production over the
next ten years.100 Moreover, the first natural gas supplies via the BTC pipeline were shipped in
2007, while the first deliveries of natural gas to the EU market via the Turkey-Greece pipeline
were shipped in 2007.101 The emerging export market enabled Azerbaijan to alter its commercial
imports structure with Russia. Prior to 2007, Azerbaijan had been importing the aforementioned
levels of natural gas at the following prices:

Figure 5. Azeri prices for natural gas imports from Russia, 2002 – 2007102
Year

2002

2004

2005

2006

2007

Price in
USD/bcm

52

52

60

110

235103

At the end of 2006, Gazprom announced it would raise natural gas prices from $110/bcm to
$235/bcm for 2007. Azerbaijan’s foreign minister called the move “unacceptable” and claimed
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the increase was “more than just a market message,” as Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus had
experienced similar price hikes.104 While the foreign minister interpreted these increases to be a
result of Russian aggression toward its neighbors, in actuality Gazprom was executing its
business strategy for the region. Armenia, one of Russia’s most important allies in the region,
experienced the same price hikes; its contract with Gazprom doubled natural gas prices from
$56/bcm in 2005 to $110/bcm in 2006.105 That Armenia faced the same gas price increase that
Azerbaijan had encountered debunks the Azeri claim of Russian favoritism; Russia’s actions are
clearly market-based if its closest allies are treated the same way as its competitors.
In making its case against Russia and offering itself as a supplier to the Europeans,
Azerbaijan asserted that “Caspian gas and oil would allow Europe to reduce its dependence on
unreliable energy suppliers,” presumably referring to Russia. The relationship between
Azerbaijan and the EU need not be zero-sum; while it is important for the Europeans to develop
sources of natural gas and oil elsewhere, relying on Azerbaijan instead of Russia perpetuates
dependence on a single supplier. It is in Europe’s best interest to maintain trade relations with
both Russia and Azerbaijan. The proposed Nord Stream pipeline, which will link Russia to
Germany by circumventing the Baltic states, has been labeled as a high priority project in the EU
because it is understood that transit states such as Ukraine and Belarus are the problem, not
Russia itself. Azerbaijan’s eagerness to portray Russia as unreliable is understandable, given its
own economic interests in the region, but it also a hyperbolic claim.
In response to Gazprom’s proposed hike for 2007, Azerbaijan withdrew from its contract with
Russia. Instead, “it redirected a portion of its crude oil production from exports to refining and

104
105

Elmar Mammadyarov, “Protect Us Against Bullies,” Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2007.
“Armenia Cedes Control of Pipeline to Gazprom,” International Herald Tribune, April 6, 2006.

Steinberg 43
used the more expensive fuel oil to make up for the gas it needed for domestic consumption.”106
Since the end of 2006, Azerbaijan has refused to import natural gas from Russia. Still, this latest
development hasn’t prevented the two countries from cooperating on a host of new deals. On
July 3, 2008, Medvedev met with Aliev to discuss the possible exportation of Azeri gas to
Russia, for which Russia would pay European market prices.107 The reciprocity of the new
bilateral agreement symbolizes the post-2000 approach Russia has taken to its energy
machinations. Further, the decision of Turkmenistan to raise its natural gas prices to European
levels has been met with understanding by Russia, which will continue to purchase it when
prices increase over the summer of 2009. The preservation of good relations with these countries,
even if only to facilitate a more favorable gas price, displays Russia’s integration within the
international order. While Russia serves as competition for Azerbaijan in the Caspian Region, its
policies reflect economic aspirations of maximizing profit, not political ones aimed at
establishing domination over Azerbaijan in the international arena.
C. Belarus
i. Belarusian – Russian Relations in Historical Perspective
Of all of the union republics, Belarus has clung the most closely to Russia after the fall of the
Soviet Union and has enjoyed special trade privileges as a result of that proximity. The past
several years under Putin have thus come as a great surprise to Belarus, which had expected to
maintain favorable trading arrangements, specifically with regards to its imports of Russian
natural gas. Belarus is 100 percent reliant on Russia for its oil imports, 80 percent reliant on
natural gas imports and has viewed rising prices with befuddled consternation. Despite the
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historically tight-knit relationship the countries have shared, the normalization of gas prices
extends to even the closest of allies.
Originally part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Belarus came under Russian rule in 1795.
Small groups of nationalists were scattered throughout the country, but the Russification of the
area imposed a Slavic identity upon most inhabitants. However, the turn of the 19th century
fostered cultural development that eventually paved the way for a Belarusian state in 1918-1919.
The Germans occupied the country shortly thereafter, ending the possibility of autonomy. In
1939, the Soviets established the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic and conducted purges
under Stalin to eliminate dissent. They banned the use of Belorussian in the local press of
western Belarus and by the 1980s, most Belarusians spoke Russian as their primary language.108
From 1965 to 1980, Pitr Maherau functioned as the first party secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of Belarus. Seen as one of the less corrupt officials, Maherau deepened
the connection Belarusians felt toward the center. Because Belarusian goods were not
competitive in Western markets, Belarus relied primarily on trade with the Soviet Union. By the
late 1980s, Belarus’ research institutions had undergone modernist updates that entailed
sophisticated technology and expanded budgets. The political climate was stable, the older
generation could look forward to an easy retirement and save for the few nationalist groups, most
citizens were content to remain under the Soviet Union’s protection.109
The situation changed drastically with the introduction of perestroika and glasnost in 1987. In
1988, the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) was established and called for complete economic
independence from Russia. The group also demanded integration with key Western institutions,
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such as the European Economic Community and NATO. In the 1990 parliamentary elections,
however, the BPF was entirely marginalized, winning less than eight percent of the total number
of seats. Unlike the nationalists in Lithuania, who fused with the Communists and galvanized a
large base of support, the BPF was disavowed by the Communists and forced to hold its congress
outside of Belarus. The political elites were accustomed to life in the Soviet Union and change
was seen as dangerous and inimical to their national goals; they opposed the nationalists at every
phase.110 In July 1990, Belarus declared state sovereignty but also designated neutrality as its
ultimate aim. It asserted its support for the USSR even as it was forced to repudiate its influence.
In August 1991, it unenthusiastically declared independence and outlawed communism, but the
members who controlled 85 percent of the legislature still considered themselves Communist,
despite the structural changes. Because the ruling elite did not embrace nationalism and the
reforms it entailed, there was strong resistance to both a free-market transition and political
decoupling from Russia. In addition, the external support from Western countries given to the
nationalists paled in comparison to the attention Russia lavished upon Belarusian elites. Though
Belarus was granted funds from the IMF and European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development to help “consolidate democratic trends,” it was not enough to supersede Russian
influence.111 By 1991, the initial economic changes proved to be disastrous for much of the
population, many of whom lost their entire life savings and saw the quality of life plummet.
Comparisons with life under the Soviet Union were inevitable; by 1995, GDP was 33.9 percent
lower than what it had been in 1991.112 In an annual poll conducted by the Belarusian Public
Opinion Center, 48 percent of Belarusians approved of the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1992.
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Three years later, only six percent did. It slowly became clear that independent statehood could
not justify such egregious economic sacrifice.
In July 1994, the Belarusians witnessed their first-ever election between two presidential
candidates. The debates between the two centered on proving who was more pro-Russian and, by
extension, less inclined to succumb to Western democratization. Alexander Lukaschenko won
the election and has remained in power since his inauguration. In the 1995 parliamentary
elections, the BPF didn’t win a single seat, which meant that the entire parliament was
effectively anti-EU and pro-CIS. A 1995 referendum registered 80 percent of voters who wanted
the Russian language to be given equal legal status with Belarusian. In addition, the majority of
Belarusians approved of Lukaschenko’s plan of economic integration with Russia. By 1995, it
was exceedingly obvious that Belarus wished to maintain the same type of relationship with
Russia as it had experienced underneath Soviet rule. For example, that same year, the Ford car
dealership opened a location in Minsk, but Belarus shut it down in 1997 because Russia owned a
77 percent stake in Slavneft, the oil company. It also controlled the Belarus-based Mozyr oil
refinery and didn’t want competition from foreigners.113 Aside from Belarusian desire to remain
close with Russia, the structural limitations of an authoritarian regime limited exposure to the
Western markets, forcing a dependence on Russian imports.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Belarus wished to remain in the ruble zone, but was
ultimately forced out in 1993 when Russia disbanded it in favor of transitioning to market prices.
In 1994, the two countries created a monetary union, with Belarus receiving energy supplies at
the same price Russian households paid. They also negotiated political agreements, which
contained vague promises of eventual integration, and at meetings between the heads of each
country in 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999, the monetary union was renewed. In 1993, Lukashenko
113

Nesvetailova, “Russia and Belarus,” 157.

Steinberg 47
had waived rights to Soviet assets in return for the elimination of its energy debts, a zero-option
deal it would repeat in 1996. By 1997, however, Belarus owed Russia $200 million in gas
payments and fees.114 The debts compounded so that by late 1998, Belarus owed half a billion
dollars. An inability to agree on prices prompted Russia to deliver supplies without a contract in
the first few months of 1999. The fluid nature of these agreements was permissible only due to
the patron-like attitude Russia took toward its protégé. Though there were claims that Russia
needed Belarus to serve as a buffer between the states that had defected and turned to the West,
Russia needed Belarus far less than Belarus needed Russia. Belarus relied on Russia not only as
a market for its goods and a source of cheap energy supplies, but also as its overseer in the
international arena. And though Russia could rely on Belarus for supporting its policies toward
the Near Abroad, as Belarus was viewed as its “appendage,” realistically the unstructured energy
agreements of the 90s hindered Russia’s ability to make a profit. With the departure of Yeltsin
from the scene, Belarus would have to accept its place as just another customer.
ii. Current oil and gas machinations with Russia
It was becoming clear that Russia needed to abandon its paternal benevolence and adopt a
tough set of agreements that would dictate universal, or near-universal, energy policies. Table 6
shows the increase in imports Belarus accumulated from 2000 to 2004. Gazprom could not
continue to subsidize these hefty imports and expect to make a profit. Thus, economic
calculations, not prior relationships, would serve as the basis from which to negotiate gas and oil
prices.
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Figure 6. Belarusian natural gas imports from Russia, 2000 – 2004115
Year

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Bcm

16.58

17.8

16.1

16.4

18

But Russia’s plans to nudge Belarus into paying market prices had to be implemented slowly.
An immediate and significant gas hike would have quickly undermined negotiations and
prevented a realistic solution from being found. Instead, Russia proposed a governmental
agreement in 2002 whereby Belarus would pay for gas at the domestic 5th band price level in
exchange for a joint venture between Gazprom and Beltransgaz, the Belarusian pipeline
monopoly. Negotiations proceeded slowly and Belarus began accumulating debt once more. In
July 2003, Belarus assigned a $5 billion value to the joint venture, of which Gazprom would
have to pay $2.5 billion in order to receive a 50 percent share, in addition to an extra $1.73
billion for refurbishment. Negotiations trailed off and in September 2003 Putin remarked: “we
have decided that Russia and Belarus should switch to market relations in this industry without
ceasing negotiations to create a single transportation company.”116 When the 2003 agreement
expired, Gazprom halted supplies and independent companies stepped in to make up for the lost
gas. The situation only deteriorated from there: a 30-hour gas stoppage in February 2004 limited
deliveries to European customers who received gas via Belarus. For the first half of 2004,
Gazprom refused to pump any more gas to Belarus, as the country refused to sell part of
Beltransgaz to Gazprom and also raised transit fees, despite previous agreements. Lukashenko
referred to the joint venture as “a crime against the Ukrainian people” and went so far as to recall
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the Belarusian ambassador.117 Answering questions in a press conference in February 2004,
Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said:
We maintained that from 1 January 2004 onwards the gas price would be commercial. When
we were saying what would be a basis for the price, we were leaning upon the Russian and
Belarusian Presidents’ agreement achieved in the city of Sochi in September of 2003. The
Presidents agreed to apply in Belarus the gas supply terms identical to those Ukraine was
abiding by.
On 30 January, the Belarusian Economics Ministry, unilaterally adopted a decision (without
coordinating it with the RF Federal Energy Commission and thus contradicting the
Agreement adopted) to raise the gas transit cost through Belarus up to USD 1.02 for the
transit of 1,000 bcm of gas per 100 km. I’d like to remind you that the cost was almost twice
as less last year, accounting for US 53 cents. We accepted these terms to avoid putting in
jeopardy gas deliveries to our consumers and said that the new cost suited us fine. But we still
don’t have the contract. So, that’s why our position is like this: no contract for gas transit, no
contract for gas deliveries. We’re reiterating our determination to deliver 10.2 bcm of gas at a
USD 50 price.118

The Russian frustration with Belarus’ breach of contract resulted in a gas cutoff, despite
2004’s unseasonably cold winters and despite the international outrage at Russia’s alleged
cruelty. Ignoring world sentiment and adhering to free-market principles, Gazprom refused to
budge on the issue until July 2004, when a new agreement was drawn up. Gazprom would
charge $46.68/bcm, similar to what the independent companies had been charging, and the
company itself would pay a transmission tariff of 0.75/mcm for using Beltransgaz’s pipelines.
Belarus accepted the terms and gas prices remained steady until 2007, when another price hike
resulted in another dispute.
In November 2006, Russia announced a four-fold price increase to $180-$200/bcm, as well as
an export tariff of $180 per ton of petroleum sold to Belarus.119 As Belarus was the only postSoviet country at the time that was paying below $50/bcm, and it hadn’t yet incurred an export
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tariff, it made financial sense for Gazprom to increase the amount per bcm and levy the tariff.
Lukashenko disagreed, protesting that Russian energy policy was inadequate and that Belarusian
prices should remain at Russian domestic levels.120 In 2006, Belarus transported 30 bcm through
the Yamal-Europe pipeline and 14.5 bcm through Beltransgaz. The Russians still coveted a 50
percent share in Beltransgaz, but Lukashenko refused to relinquish it. Instead, in retaliation for
the expected hike, Belarus levied a $45 per ton transit fee on the petroleum the Russians sent to
Western Europe. Russia agreed to lower its export duty from $180 to $53 and lower gas prices to
$!00/bcm in exchange for the abolition of the transit fee. A deal was also finally struck with
respect to Russian ownership of Beltransgaz. Gazprom would pay $2.5 billion over four years for
50 percent of Beltranzgaz shares. By 2011, the natural gas price for Belarus would reach the
European level, and the transit tariff Russia would pay would increase from .75 to 1.45/tcm per
hundred kilometers.121
According to the agreement with the European Union regarding World Trade Organization
membership, in order for Russia to join it must eliminate all domestic subsidies by 2011.
Accordingly, the elimination of subsidies for Belarus seemed likely to occur. Alexander
Medvedev claimed that the WTO insisted upon free-market trading with Russia’s CIS
partners.122 However, because details of the agreement have not been made public, it is not
known whether Russia is required to eliminate subsidies for its foreign market as well.
According to David Tarr, the former lead economist at the World Bank, it is unlikely that Russia
signed anything formally relating to the elimination of subsidies for its neighbors.123 Still,
because Belarus pricing reflected pricing for Russian domestic consumers, it is logical that the
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country should pay whatever Russia’s households pay (or more, in line with Russia’s new
approach).
Smith contends that Russian actions toward Belarus in 2006 were an “intensification of
Russia’s petro-politics that began as early as 1990.”124 But the sharp divergence in policy
between the Yeltin era and Putin’s reign underscores the different mechanisms Russia had in
place to deal with energy negotiations. Tables 7 and 8 depict the prices Belarus has paid for
crude oil (contrasted here with the European Union’s price) and natural gas, respectively.

Figure 7. Belarusian and European Union prices per ton of crude oil from Russia, 2001 – 2006125
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Belarus

116

---

133

182

218

268

European
Union

156 (+40)

---

181 (+48)

233 (+51)

350 (+132)

470 (+202)

As Figure 7 indicates, the difference between Belarusian and European crude oil prices has
still widened, in spite of Russian efforts to close the gap. Even as prices have doubled for the
European countries, Belarus has still commanded a large subsidy, despite protests from the
Belarusian government. As Figure 8 shows, however, Gazprom has been more successful at
negotiating a deal that will eventually move Belarus to market prices.
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Figure 8. Belarusian prices for natural gas imports from Russia, 2001 – 2011126
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To demonstrate the efficacy of free market principles, it is worth noting that Russia is not the
only country to increase its prices in the ongoing dispute with Belarus. On January 6, 2008,
Belarus raised the oil transit rates: the rate for pumping oil via the Unecha (Vysokoye) Adamova Zastava (toward Poland and Germany) pipeline was raised by 15.7 percent to 2.8 euro
per ton and the rate for the Unecha (Vysokoye) - Brody route was raised by 16.7 percent to 1.2
euro per ton. Further oil transit fees were announced on January 8, 2009. The transit fee for using
the Unecha (Vysokoye) to Adamova Zastava will be raised by 22.5 percent to 3.43 euro per
ton.127
The market manipulations between Russia and Belarus have been blown out of proportion.
While the paternal relationship between the countries influenced oil and natural gas prices in the
1990s, since Putin took power there has been a shift toward the normalization of policies. The
route toward unregulated markets is not contingent upon political relationships or sympathies
toward dependent countries. Gazprom’s need for revenues trumps sentimental friendship – and
as Belarus’ transit fees indicate, the country seems to understand.
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VI. Comparisons and Implications
A. Lithuania, Azerbaijan and Belarus
These three cases are useful comparisons because they illustrate a) historical and current
variations with Russia and b) differing levels of dependence on Russian energy. Using “most
different” system analysis shows that three countries with diverse backgrounds nevertheless
experience the same pattern of normalization of oil and natural gas prices since 2000 (see Figure
9).
Figure 9. Comparison of Lithuania, Azerbaijan and Belarus
Variation in Initial Conditions

Variable

Country
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Yes
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The variables contained within the table can be compared so as to underscore the differences
between the countries and how Russia’s approach toward all three has been consistent with its
business strategy. Historically, all three countries declared independence from Moscow in
August 1991; Lithuania was the most enthusiastic about the prospect of autonomy, Belarus was
hesitant, and Azerbaijan fell somewhere in between. The manner of secession from the Soviet
Union dictated the paths the countries would take toward their former master. Lithuania was
eager to cast away all political and economic ties binding it to Russia – even if it meant forsaking
cheap energy supplies. Azerbaijan was generally ambivalent toward its relationship with Russia,
but cultivated strong business ties with both Gazprom and Western oil and gas companies.
Belarus, on the other end of the spectrum, remained committed to the notion of a monetary and
an eventual political union between the two countries and was happy to remain under Russia’s
protection.
As these three countries sought to define themselves in the post-Soviet space, energy
negotiations with Russia were underlain with identity politics. The Kremlin used energy as a
political weapon in the 1990s, meant to instill fear or evince policy changes in its former
republics, and the wielding of such a powerful tool led both Lithuania and Azerbaijan to seek
greater ingratiation with the West. Lithuanian relations with Moscow were hostile in the 1990s,
and gradually thawed post-2000, but still remain strained. Azerbaijan has managed to carefully
balance Russia and Western countries since the early 1990s, though it has shown greater
proclivity toward the West since 2000. Belarus, on the other hand, is grateful for Russian
patronage and has continued to resist Western attempts at democratization.
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Economically, despite attempts to shed its dependence on Russia, Lithuania was forced to
import nearly all of its natural gas and oil supplies via Gazprom’s pipelines. Belarus also
remained a lucrative source of revenue for Gazprom, as it experienced a high level of
dependence on Russian natural gas. Azerbaijan, by contrast, began developing its own oil and
natural gas fields in the early 2000s and was able to minimize its dependence on Russian imports
by 2006.
Despite the countries’ varying historical backgrounds, current economic and political
relationships with Russia and levels of dependence on Russian energy, all three have been
guided toward a similar trajectory characterized by Russian elimination of subsidies and
normalization of oil and gas prices. The nature of the disputes between Russia and each of the
three countries is strikingly similar when viewed holistically as part of a greater regional trend.
All three countries have been subjected to the gradual elimination of subsidies, annual (or semiannual) gas price hikes and gas supply stoppage. Lithuania’s experiences in 2004 and 2006,
Azerbaijan’s disputes in 2006 and 2007, and Belarus’s yearly gas battles embody the
convergence of Russian policy in the region. Since 2000, Putin has championed free-market
principles to govern business interactions as an alternative to Yeltsin’s politically-soaked
machinations. That Azerbaijan and Armenia, Russia’s competition and close ally, respectively,
received the same gas price increase speaks volumes about Russian intentions to accede to both
realist and neo-liberal institutionalist tenets. Moreover, Gazprom’s decision to supply gas at
unregulated prices in 2011 to domestic industrial consumers is an important signifier of broad
changes in national energy policy. The need for revenues, coupled with the need to reallocate
funds toward investment and exploration, has prompted Gazprom to take the politically-risky
move of increasing prices for domestic consumers. Allowing foreign subsidies to remain, while
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phasing out domestic ones, makes little economic sense and would defeat the purpose of
deregulating domestic prices.128
The prices themselves have been converging for all three countries. Lithuania is expected to
pay around $350-$400/bcm in 2009, while Belarus will pay 80 percent of market price in 2009.
Azerbaijan, had it not turned down Russia’s offer, would also be expected to pay similar
numbers for its gas. Inevitably, there will still be marginal differences in what each country pays
for energy supplies; transit tariffs, transportation costs, the amount of equity Gazprom retains,
etc., are all important factors to be taken into consideration. Still, Russia’s attempt to make
Gazprom an indispensable global energy company necessarily entails a uniform strategy for all
of its customers.
B. Russia in Comparison to Emerging Powers
When Russia increased its shares in Gazprom to become the majority stakeholder, critics
immediately denounced the intrusion of the state into a private company. Indeed, the state’s
50.002 percent share has encouraged revisionist interpretations of the Russian government’s use
of Gazprom to facilitate its grand strategy. Recently, however, national oil companies have
become the norm and private companies the aberration. Belying revisionist accusations, Russian
actions adhere to an international phenomenon: the rise of national oil companies. To illustrate
that Russian state ownership is neither revisionist nor unique, we can compare it to other
countries that have built up their national oil companies.
The International Energy Agency’s list of 50 leading oil and gas companies of 2007
underscores how many top oil and gas companies are state-owned. The presence of so many
state-owned companies on this list is testament to a macroeconomic trend over the past several
128
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years: the emergence of national oil companies and the resultant decline of international oil
companies such as Shell, BP and Chevron Total. Of the 50 leading oil and gas companies
(ranked by total oil and gas production), 27 of them are partially or wholly state-owned. The
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) ranks seventh on the list, with state ownership
totaling 100 percent, while Petrobras of Brazil (56 percent state ownership), Petronas of
Malaysia (100 percent), StatoilHydro of Norway (63 percent), Sinopec of China (100 percent),
also appear. Mexico’s Pemex and Turkey’s TPAO are also 100 percent state-owned, though they
don’t appear on the list of top producing companies.129 The prominence of national oil
companies signifies a change in the way states prefer to do business; democratic states such as
India and Brazil have embraced national oil companies as fervently as Saudi Arabia and Ecuador
have. Because these state-owned companies promote industrialization and economic and social
development, they are key players in solidifying both national energy strategies and energy
security.130 More tellingly, since they control most of the world’s oil and gas reserves, the
companies’ share of oil production is expected to rise 57 percent in 2007 to 62 percent in 2030.
Similarly, their share of natural gas output is expected to rise from 44 percent to 55 percent.131
China and India provide two good examples of emerging powers, like Russia, that are faced
with increased energy consumption and must ensure steady supply for their consumers. Chinese
net energy consumption is expected to rise from 59.6 quadrillion BTUs (British thermal units) in
2004 to 145.5 quadrillion in 2030, an increase of 144 percent. Projecting China’s consumption of
world energy to total 20.7 percent in 2030, the International Energy Agency speculates that
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China must invest $3.7 trillion in natural gas and oil development to provide energy for the
emergent middle class consumers who will buy cars, air conditioning, and other such devices.132
While emerging powers are still holding discussions with multinational companies, the
inclination toward strategic partnerships with national firms has become a welcome form of
diplomacy. The previous Chinese approach to its energy security had been to focus on its
domestic supply of coal. As the coal deposits are proving insufficient in light of rising demand,
however, China has begun to diversify its energy portfolio by reaching out to the other countries
and working with state-controlled firms. The Chinese government sets the major objectives for
its energy companies: CNPC, Sinopec and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC). The government selects the chief operating officers, consults on major acquisitions
and provides generous loans from state-owned banks. In addition, President Hu Jintao and
Premier Wen Jiabao travel to other countries acting as the “advance men” for the oil companies.
Much like Putin and Medevev, who are present at every meeting at which bilateral treaties are
signed between Russia and other countries, so too do China’s leaders act as the front-men for the
energy industry. Because there is a “distinct preference for forging alliances between state
controlled forms and national oil companies of other countries,” the Chinese leadership wishes to
laud those occasions as diplomatic events, complete with promises of further cooperation.133 For
instance, in 1999, Sinopec reached out to Saudi Arabia’s Aramco and formed a strategic oil
partnership. Sinopec will work with Aramco to develop natural gas fields in Saudi Arabia, in
exchange for Aramco’s construction of refineries in China. This relationship is only one of
several China is currently advancing; it is working with Gazprom to deliver Russian natural gas
and is also conducting talks with Kazakhstan regarding the importation of Kazakh natural gas.
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India is also a useful example because its standards of business are thought to be more
transparent due to its democratic underpinnings. Continuing the historical trend of central
planning, however, the government retains control over 75 percent of the country’s energy
companies, which include Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), Indian Oil Corporation,
and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation. Like the Russian government, the Indian government has
not hesitated to impose price ceilings and force its companies to sell oil below cost.134 This has
resulted in some oil companies’ failing to make a profit some quarters and has prompted their
executives to call for the elimination of domestic subsidies.
In 2006, India’s energy consumption totaled 17.1 quadrillion BTUs, estimated to rise to 31.9
quadrillion in 2030.135 In an attempt to bolster its energy activities, India has actively been
seeking properties around the globe. Thus far, it has acquired oil and gas fields in Algeria,
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Libya, Russia, Sudan, Syria and Vietnam. Following China’s lead in
stressing strategic partnerships, ONGC has paired with Venezuela’s PdVSA in the development
of the Orinoco oil sands in South America and with an Iranian oil company in the exploitation of
Iran’s South Pars gas deposit.
Brazil is another emerging power that has utilized its national oil company to further the
country’s aims – namely, energy integration – in the Southern Cone. Petrobras, the state oil
company, was founded in 1953 as an exclusively state-controlled company, but allowed for some
privatization in 1997. Today, the state owns 56 percent of shares and since the early 1990s has
embarked upon ambitious plans to become the main energy supplier in the region. It has acquired
regional distribution companies in Bolivia and Argentina, built a pipeline to Bolivia and set up
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operations in eight countries in South America.136 One of the consistently high-performing
companies in South America, Petrobras expects to double its production of oil from 2.18 million
barrels per day in 2008 to 3.31 million in 2013 and to 5.1 million by 2020.137 Answering to the
state and to its 170,000 shareholders, Petrobras is intent on becoming one of the world’s top five
energy companies.138 Like Gazprom, its goal is to become an internationally-recognized
company that still strives to maximize profits to the state. Though Brazil’s plans for expansion
are analogous to Russia’s desires to control local regional companies, the media has focused on
Gazprom as an extension of Russian might while ignoring Petrobras’s similar activities.
National oil and gas companies face a pressing dilemma: they must be attuned to the needs of
the titular constituencies while also maximizing profits. To that end, the state has spent political
capital to make economic gains at the expense of a disgruntled citizenry. Because large domestic
subsidies undercut the oil companies’ profitability and “limit funds for capital spending,” the
companies have been forced to introduce reforms that will improve their market performance.139
One significant reform is the elimination of subsidies that allow for an increase in oil and gas
revenues, the track Gazprom has taken. The Russian gas industry especially is at a crossroads as
the country’s main fields decline and production shifts to regions that are difficult to access and
even more difficult to exploit. To invest in more field exploration, Gazprom needs to reallocate
funds it has expended on domestic and foreign subsidies in the past.

136

Igor Fuser, “Petrobras and the Conflicts for Resources in South America,” Paper presented at
the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th Annual Convention, March 26, 2008, Accessed at:
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/4/3/0/pages254308/p254308-1.php
137
Jonathan Wheatley, “Petrobras to pump $28bn into pre-salt fields,” Financial Times, January 25, 2009.
138
Petrobras. “Corporate Information.” Accessed at:
http://www2.petrobras.com.br/ingles/ads/ads_Petrobras.html
139
International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook, 350.

Steinberg 61
VI. Conclusions
This paper has undertaken both internal and external comparisons to illustrate that Russia’s
energy negotiations rest on economic principles meant to advance national interests. The
comparison of Russian energy policies toward Lithuania, Azerbaijan and Belarus, three countries
with varying relations and levels of dependence, indicate a standardized pricing mechanism
Russia is putting in place. Since 2000, Belarus, a country that enjoys close relations with Russia,
has experienced the same sort of natural gas and oil price hikes that less friendly countries like
Lithuania and Azerbaijan have encountered. Because the three countries have immensely diverse
backgrounds, the uniform pricing measures Russia has implemented indicates the extent to
which economics underlies the negotiations. Russia’s national energy strategy since 2000 has
been one of normalization and adherence to free-market principles because Gazprom can no
longer afford to subsidize foreign and domestic subsidies. While the recipient countries have
been undoubtedly distressed over the loss of cheap energy, Gazprom’s cutting off the gas supply
had little to do with political retribution and everything to do with the necessity of enforcing
previous agreements. In the post-Soviet space of the 2000s, Russia’s position is unequivocal: pay
for the gas or it gets turned off.
It is not enough to point out the unfair treatment of Russia, however, without offering
comments on how the revisionist interpretation might be discarded. The question invariably
becomes one of approach. Keeping Russian intentions in mind, how should countries look upon
the 2009 Russo-Ukrainian gas war, for instance, and more importantly, Russian energy policy in
general? A few recommendations can fashion the explicit arguments within this paper into policy
proposals to stabilize Western relations with Russia.
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First, Western diplomats must reorient their attitudes toward Russian behavior. Though the
reset button Hilary Clinton offered to Sergei Lavrov as an expression of bridge-mending made
for a good photo opportunity, the State Department should stop viewing Russia with the
suspicion that has colored policy as Russian-American relations have deteriorated. Both the State
Department and the U.S. Congress, specifically the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
subscribe to the revisionist images perpetuated by well-meaning policy wonks. Instead of
generating further understanding, they disseminate the image of Russia as an expansionist, neoimperialist power. Toning down the rhetoric of Russia as an “energy blackmailer”140 will
increase Russian trust and help combat misperceptions. Understanding Russia as a capitalist
entity bent on maximizing profits, not politics, can guide diplomats in how they deal with
problems that arise in the future. Instead of a knee-jerk recourse to Cold War-era mentalities of
bipolarity, a measured response on behalf of the U.S.’s top officials will be greatly appreciated
by their Russian counterparts. Divesting the relationship of the mistrust that has characterized it
for so long, then, becomes a crucial step in bridging relations.
We can observe the effects of this new approach by placing it within the context of the RussoUkrainian gas dispute of December 2008 and January 2009. In November 2008, Gazprom
officials met with Ukrainian representatives to discuss Ukraine’s outstanding debts to Gazprom
for delivered but unpaid gas, which totaled $2.4 billion. Unable to agree on a contract for 2009
that would both address the missed payments and set a new price for natural gas deliveries,
Gazprom shut off the gas supply on January 1, 2009 and halted deliveries for export to Europe
on January 6 because it suspected Ukraine was siphoning off gas for domestic consumption.141
The two countries met frequently over the next several weeks, wrangling over the prices Russia
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suggested and the prices with which Ukraine countered. As the negotiations continued, millions
of citizens in Eastern Europe suffered a bitterly cold winter without heat. It wasn’t until January
20 that a deal was cemented: Ukraine would pay $208-$240/bcm in 2009, a 20 percent discount
on European prices that would be eliminated the following year.142 The initial media response to
the dispute proclaimed Ukrainian innocence and Russian aggression. Critics deemed the crisis a
repeat of the 2006 cutoff Gazprom had enacted. In 2006, critics accused Russia of punishing
Ukraine for its political orientation toward the West; Gazprom, for its part, argued that the lack
of a viable contract prevented the company from supplying regular shipments. In both the 2006
and 2009 disputes, it was evident that the wielding of political leverage did not interest Gazprom
executives, who were more concerned about breaching their contracts to their European
customers in the wake of alleged Ukrainian stealing of gas.
It has become easy and commonplace to dismiss Russo-Ukrainian gas altercations as just
another political spat, but the alternative explanation offered in this paper suggests a different
approach is necessary. Russia can make the case that Ukraine is executing energy blackmail by
taking gas meant for export to the Europeans and disrupting transit. Moreover, Gazprom’s
complaints regarding the lack of a contract that satisfied its concerns cannot be dismissed. Under
the stipulations of this paper’s argument, one could claim that Gazprom was the victim in this
instance, as Ukraine’s outstanding debts and inability to accept the elimination of cheap gas
effectively penalized Europeans who are dependent upon the country as a transit state. Future
discussions regarding natural gas between Russia and Ukraine are certain to occur; not for the
political reasons The New York Times espouses, but for the economic realities that force
Gazprom to shut off supply if it is not guaranteed payment.
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This analysis has sought to refute impressionistic and sensationalistic treatments of Russian
energy policy in both media and academic circles. By highlighting a convergence of policy
toward Lithuania, Azerbaijan and Belarus, this paper suggested an alternative explanation for
Gazprom’s rigid adherence to its pricing structure. Ultimately, Russia is neither revisionist nor
unique. Its actions toward its neighbors are reflective of a uniform energy policy put in place by
Putin and continued by Medvedev. Russia has explicitly conveyed its stance of an emerging
power seeking to champion its national interests by maximizing the profits of its oil and natural
gas companies. It is important to realize that Russia’s posture as a revisionist state has been
exaggerated by those who vilify its energy machinations. While Gazprom may function as a tool
of the state, it seeks profits, not political retribution, a fact that Western scholars and pundits
would do well to remember the next time a gas battle erupts.
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Current and planned Gazprom delivery routes144
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Appendix C
Regulated vs. unregulated gas prices for Russian industrial consumers, 2007145
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Gazprom in Figures 2003 – 2007, 54. Anticipating the 2011 changes for industrial gas prices, Gazprom
calculated “indicative gas prices” for the 3rd and 4th quarters of 2007 that would demonstrate how much more
revenue could be taken in if the prices were unregulated and allowed to fluctuate freely. The indicative prices were
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